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Abstract
This is a study of predicting success in the NBA based on college experience, and repredicting after the rookie year of professional basketball. All first and second round picks
from the 1985 draft through the 2005 draft are included in overall analysis, with 841 players
having had at least one year of NBA experience and have played on a Division I NCAA team.
The primary endpoints used in analyses are Player Efficiency Rating (PER), win shares, and
win shares per 48 minutes. This paper will predict the success of picks using their draft pick,
college statistics (both qualitative and quantitative), and physical qualities (height and
weight). Also, rookie year statistics are used to update the analysis to determine if any
additional information is gained after one year of professional basketball. This study
concludes that a statistical analysis of college statistics predicted performance well using win
shares per 48 minutes, but did not improve predicted performance with PER and win shares
for first round draft picks. In addition, one of the predictive formulas was able to predict
performance of the top 100 NBA prospects with higher accuracy than the actual draft.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the National Basketball Association (NBA), millions of dollars and thousands of
man hours are spent researching players eligible to be drafted in the NBA draft. During the
draft, teams have the opportunity to choose players to add to their rosters. One of the benefits
of the draft is that parity is instilled around the league. Teams with the worst records have a
chance to sign the most talented players available in a given year. The teams with the best
records have lower draft picks, and thus, usually less talented players to sign. Otherwise, if
players were able to sign with whichever teams they wanted, the teams that experienced the
most success would be the most popular destinations. With the draft, there is hope for every
team to sign a potential superstar.
If the system was perfect, the best player would be taken first, the second best player
would be taken second, and so forth. But, as history has shown, there have been many
misfires in predicting the talent of NBA prospects. The most notorious pick in the NBA draft
belongs to the Portland Trailblazers, who, with the second pick in the 1984 NBA draft, chose
Sam Bowie, a center out of Kentucky, over Michael Jordan, who is widely considered to be
the best player in the history of the NBA (Golliver, 2012). The Chicago Bulls went on to win
six NBA Championships with Jordan, and Jordan retired with five MVP awards, 10 scoring
titles, and the highest points per game average in NBA history. Bowie had a lengthy career,
but dealt with multiple leg injuries which ultimately diminished his ability to live up to his
lofty potential.
Looking at a more recent example, Greg Oden, a center from Ohio State, and Kevin
Durant, a forward out of the University of Texas, were widely considered to be the top two
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prospects in the 2007 NBA draft. Once again, the Portland Trailblazers, who owned the
number one overall pick, had to make a difficult decision. Once again, they chose the
dominant seven footer over the dynamic scorer (2007 NBA Draft, n.d.). Oden would suffer
multiple knee injuries throughout his career, ultimately playing in 105 games. Durant would
go on to win four scoring titles and an MVP trophy before his 26th birthday.
There are other instances where teams have passed up future All-Stars to draft players
that would ultimately be out of the league in a few years, which leads to the question: Can the
way that talent is evaluated leading up to the draft be improved? This paper will put forth
analytical tools to better predict which players will become productive NBA players, using
Player Efficiency Rating (PER), win shares, and win shares per minute as our criteria. These
variables will be defined in the next section of this paper.
One important question to ask at the beginning of the study is who wants to know
about this study and what do they want to know about it? Inherently, the people who would
benefit from this information would be owners and general managers (GM’s) of the 30 NBA
franchises, the people who draft and sign players to multi-million dollar contracts. NBA teams
want to win championships. On the court, that is the ultimate goal. This paper will attempt to
quantify the most important factors in predicting success in the NBA, using college basketball
statistics. It will also predict NBA success after 1 year of experience in the NBA, to see what
knowledge, if any, is gained about the success of a player’s career. Ultimately, this paper will
put forth additional resources to be used by NBA teams in preparing for the NBA draft.
Predicting PER and win shares will be the focus of our analysis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
An area that has had extensive research in predicting future success is major league
baseball (MLB). Since the history of MLB is quite long, there have been many opportunities
for people to analyze the huge sets of data that the games produce. Bill James, widely
considered the father of modern baseball analytics, began this trend of looking deeper into the
data in 1977 with his book The Bill James Baseball Abstract. Instead of recapping the games
and interviewing the players, James looked at the box scores, and tried to discern patterns
hidden in the data. Within a few years, many in the baseball community were taking notice.
James introduced new terms, such as Runs Produced and Win Shares, which are commonly
used today when evaluating players (Zminda, 2010).
Naturally, since this paper is looking at NCAA basketball statistics to predict NBA
success, it makes sense to compare to the work being done in the MLB. The main difference,
however, is that MLB actually has a minor league system. There are three levels of minor
league baseball: A, AA, and AAA, with A being the lowest and AAA being the highest, one
level below MLB. Since the NBA does not have a minor league system, NCAA basketball is
the closest thing relatively to minor league baseball.
Just as PER is a catch-all statistic in the NBA, Wins Above Replacement, or WAR,
has become the all-in-one statistic used to evaluate MLB players. WAR can be used for both
pitchers and position players to determine how many wins a player contributes above what a
“replacement”, or average, player would provide. With WAR as the primary endpoint for
career success, Tymkovich (2012) looks at the pre-draft rankings of players, and compares
their career WAR to determine how successfully the players were ranked before they were
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drafted. It was found that the three top publications for ranking MLB prospects [Baseball
America, Baseball Prospectus, and John Sickels (ESPN)] were all successful in predicting
players who would have higher career WAR.
There are different ways to measure success in MLB. Chandler and Stevens (2012)
created a variable called ML Contribution, which was simply a binary variable with 1 =
player made it to MLB, and 0 = player did not make it to MLB. Looking at 1,019 minor
league players who played at least 15 minor league games between 1999 and 2002, they used
traditional baseball metrics (runs, runs batted in, batting average, etc.) to predict if a player
would make it up to the major leagues. Using classification trees, which splits up the sample
using different criteria (e.g., AVG > .250 and AVG <= .250), they were able to determine
which variables were significant in predicting players moving up to MLB. While none were
significant at A level minor league baseball, at AA and AAA, batting average, on-base
percentage, slugging percentage, and on-base percentage plus slugging were all significant
positive predictors in a player moving up to MLB. This shows not only that players are ranked
well before the draft, but that teams can look at concrete numbers from the minor leagues to
predict success.
As analysts get smarter about looking deeper into the data for predicting future success
in sports, it would naturally follow that certain variables would lose relevancy over time.
Chang and Zenilman (2013) decided to split the recent history of baseball into three periods:
pre-Moneyball, post-Moneyball, and post-post-Moneyball. Moneyball is in reference to the
Oakland Athletics in the 2002 season. Oakland’s management decided to use new analytical
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methods in their pursuit of new players to acquire. Despite early ridicule, the Athletics went
on to have a very successful season, including a 20 game winning streak.
Looking at the pre-Moneyball era, length of a player’s contract, a player’s height,
stolen bases, on-base percentage plus slugging, and how many double plays a player grounded
into were all significant variables in predicting salary, which is an indication of the faith an
organization has in a player. Once into the post-Moneyball era, height and stolen bases lost
their significance. This was due mainly to height being attributed to being better at baseball,
and total stolen bases being considered a measurement of speed, regardless of how efficiently
those bases were being stolen. Once there had been significant time after Moneyball, the postpost-Moneyball era, in 2011, a completely different picture comes into focus. Only WAR,
Length of Contract, and how many double plays a player grounded into were significant in
predicting salary. This shows the shift in thinking from using the eye test on a player to really
looking at the numbers they are producing on the field. As the sophistication of analysis
increases for a sport, the important factors to look at will also change. The work in baseball
analytics leads into the work that has been done in the realm of predicting NBA success.
Several studies have undertaken the task of studying the NBA draft for economic
purposes, treating the NBA as an enterprise and the players as the employees. Staw and
Hoang (1995) were the first to examine sunk costs in the NBA draft. In economics, sunk costs
refer to the money already invested in a project, and the decision to be made to continue the
project. In most studies, the higher the amount invested in the study, the more likely the
decision to continue on with the project, regardless of potential future gains. Using players
from the first two rounds of the draft from 1980 to 1986, they found that teams were more
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likely to give higher draft picks more playing time, even after accounting for their statistical
output on the court. The study found that draft pick order was a highly significant indicator of
playing time, time until a trade, and length of career. Whether the relationship between draft
pick order and the three variables is from teams giving their higher picks more time to show
the abilities that the team thought the players had, or from top picks just being thought of as
better because they were top picks, where a player was chosen in the draft was a significant
factor through at least the first 5 years of a player’s career. This makes it that much more
important that those top picks be properly picked, since they historically will get more playing
time and have longer careers than lower ranked players.
Taking what Staw and Hoang did and enhancing it, Camerer and Weber (1999) used
an updated sample, the players taken in the first two rounds of the draft from 1986 through
1991, as long as the players had at least a two year career. This study went much more in
depth, including additional factors not considered in the previous study, such as quality of a
player’s back up on his team, and rankings of a player before the draft. The rankings used by
Camerer and Weber were pre-draft scouting reports, done by Don Leventhal, an NBA
Analyst. These rankings differed from where a player was predicted to go in the draft. If a
point guard may be very talented, but the top three teams all have All-Star caliber point
guards, he will most likely go to the team picking fourth. In conclusion, Camerer and Weber
found that there was an issue with sunk costs and overcommitting to high draft picks in the
NBA, just as Staw and Hoang had said, but the strength of the relationship was only half the
magnitude of Staw and Hoang’s findings.
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Flipping the script from sunk costs in draft picks, Groothuis, Hill, and Perri (2007)
decided to find all of the superstars currently playing in the NBA, and see where those they
were drafted. The authors define a superstar to be any player who had a player efficiency
more than two standard deviations above the mean in each year from 1987 to 2004. This
resulted in 12 to 22 players each year being considered “superstars,” at least by this measure.
They also looked at the top five players each year in player efficiency. They found that there
is no strong relationship between these players and draft pick, meaning that a superstar can
come from anywhere in the draft, and often does. Beyond the #1 pick, which has produced
many superstars, a lot of the top picks are “false positives”, players that do not develop into
the type of player the teams that drafted them thought they would turn into.
This shows what has been obvious to everyone in the NBA: drafting is not an exact
science. It would also do good to look at what coaches in the NBA value in their players. The
All-Rookie NBA team consists of two teams of five players each, First Team and Second
Team. Coaches vote for this award, which makes it unique among NBA awards, since most
awards are voted on by the media. A coach cannot vote for his own player, so 29 coaches are
available to vote for any given rookie. Coaches give two points for a player for a first team
vote, and one point for a second team vote. This gives a possible range of 0 to 58 points for
each player. When doing a regression using All-Rookie voting as the dependent variable, with
points per game being the only explanatory variable, Berri, Brook, and Schmidt (2007) found
that 74% of the variance in the voting can be explained. This shows that points per game is a
huge factor for coaches in determining who will be All-Rookie. Even after adding in several
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additional counting stats, the coefficient of determination is only 76%, which means the
additional variables do not have a big impact on the voting.
Considering the fact that scoring explains most of the variation in rookie of the year
voting, and the voting is done only by the coaches, it appears that coaches are subject to
overvaluing points scored, especially when points have never had an especially strong
correlation with wins (Galletti, 2010). In recent years, there has been a heavier emphasis
placed on scoring efficiency, and not just scoring. Organizations seem to be looking deeper
into the data to figure out how to win games.
Since it has been established that draft position does have some bearing on a player’s
playing time and length of career, the next step is to look at how well college career statistics
will predict where a player will be drafted. Coates and Oguntimein (2008) use points,
rebounds, assists, steals, turnovers, blocks, personal fouls, field goal percentage, free throw
percentage, and three formulas for productivity to predict draft position for all draftees
between 1987 and 1989 who have at least one year experience in the NBA. The first
productivity formula, used by the NBA as a comprehensive statistic for player productivity, is
as follows:
(1) ((PTS+ REBS+ ASTS+ STLS+ BLKS)-(FGA-FGM) + (FTA-FTM) + (TO)) /
(MP)
Two additional formulas are used by Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006). The first does
not account for assists, and the second does. They are as follows:
(2) ((PTS + REBS+ STLS+ (0.5) BLKS+ FGA- (0.5) FTA- TO- (0.5) PF)/ (MP)
and
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(3) ((PTS + REBS+ STLS+ (0.5) BLKS+ (0.5) ASTS - FGA- (0.5) FTA- TO- (0.5)
PF)/ (MP)
Coates and Oguntimein (2008) found that scoring, scoring efficiency (field goal
percentage and free throw percentage), blocks, assists, and rebounds all have a positive
correlation with a player’s draft stock, but only for schools from large conferences (ACC, Big
12, Big Ten, SEC, Pac 12, and Big East). For players from smaller conferences, scoring
efficiency, free throw shooting, and blocks were the only factors that significantly improved
their draft position. Scoring, rebounds, and assists did not have an effect on draft pick. This
reveals that NBA teams don’t care about the raw totals of points, rebounds, and assists when
it comes to players from small schools, since they are most likely playing against inferior
competition. What they do look for is scoring efficiency, and the best way for a small school
player to improve his draft stock is to improve his field goal percentage and free throw
percentage.
Coates and Oguntimein performed a correlation analysis between college statistics and
NBA statistics, using the same variables as before. Except for field goal percentage, every
college statistic was significantly correlated with its corresponding NBA statistic. This proves
that a relationship does exist between college performance and NBA performance, and
therefore, we can try to quantify it to predict which players will be most successful. Breaking
down the analysis, NBA points was used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis,
with the same independent variables as in the previous analysis. There were four variables
that were significant: college points per game, an interaction variable between college points
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per game and large conference/small conference, an interaction variable between college
points per game and whether the player had played on a championship team, and draft pick.
When predicting minutes played, several variables were significant, including scoring
and rebounding as the two most significant. But interestingly, college rebounds and NBA
playing time were negatively correlated; meaning a higher rebounding average in college
brought you less playing time in the NBA. There were additional interactions between college
stats and NBA stats. For example, one additional rebound per game in college resulted in .25
more rebounds per game in the NBA. One additional steal per game in college led to .4 more
steals as a pro. As for scoring, a 10% increase in scoring average in college led to the player
having a 4% higher scoring average in the NBA. Perhaps the most telling relationship was
between conference and length of NBA career: a player drafted from a large conference had,
on average, a career that was four years longer than a player drafted from a small conference.
This tells us that the school a player comes from is also an important factor.
Based on the aforementioned studies, it can be concluded that college statistics are
indeed valuable and predictive when looking at NBA statistics, with points scored being the
most significant variable in terms of draft position and All-Rookie voting. It can also be
concluded that these statistics are not the only important information, or else choosing the
most successful players would be much easier. With this limitation in mind, this paper will
still attempt to quantify the likelihood of a college player having a successful NBA career.
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Chapter 3: Background
History of the Draft
The first year of the draft was 1947, when the NBA was still the Basketball
Association of America (BAA). The order of the draft was the inverse of the standings from
the previous year. So the team with the worst record got the first pick, the team with the
second worst record received the second pick, and so forth. This was in place until 1966,
when the teams with the worst record in each conference would have a coin flip to see who
received the #1 pick. The winner received 1st pick, the loser received 2nd, and the remaining
teams went in the inverse of the standings, as it had been (NBA.com: Evolution of the Draft
and Lottery, n.d.).
This stayed common practice until 1985, when the first lottery system was introduced.
The purpose of the lottery was to discourage tanking, or the practice of intentionally losing
games in order to garner a high draft pick. The Houston Rockets had received the #1 pick two
years in a row, and owners were frustrated at the Rockets being guaranteed the #1 pick by
having the worst record in the NBA. Under this new arrangement, all of the non-playoff teams
would have an equal chance of landing the #1 pick. The first year, there were eight nonplayoff teams, and all eight of their spots were selected through the lottery. Two years later,
the NBA altered the draft rules so that only the first three picks of the draft would be chosen
by the lottery, and the remaining teams would receive their draft picks by inverse order of the
standings (NBA.com: Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, n.d.).
There have been small changes to the lottery system since its inception. In 1989, the
NBA draft went down to only two rounds. In the past, teams were able to keep selecting
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players in later rounds until they ran out of prospects. The longest drafts were in 1960 and
1968, each of which lasted 21 rounds. In 1974, the NBA set the limit at 10 rounds. Eleven
years later, in 1985, the length was shortened to seven rounds. Finally, in 1989, in agreement
with the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), the NBA set the draft to have two
rounds. This shortened the duration of the draft, and limited the number of players who would
be drafted. Any undrafted player would have the opportunity to try out with whichever team
he wanted. The following year, in 1990, a weighted system was introduced, which gave the
team with the worst record a much higher chance to win the lottery, and the non-playoff team
with the best record a very small chance to win the lottery. This still gave the worst teams the
best chance for the #1 pick, but gave all lottery teams a chance to win. As the number of
teams in the NBA expanded, the number of teams included in the lottery increased. In 2004,
the number of lottery teams was increased to 14, where it still stands today (NBA.com:
Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, n.d.).
Draft Eligibility
There are certain requirements for players to be eligible for the draft. The rule created
for NBA draft eligibility in the 1960s was the a player needed to complete 4 years of college
before being eligible for the draft. Spencer Haywood, a star basketball player from Detroit,
Michigan, attended Trinidad State Junior College in Colorado for one year, and subsequently
transferred to the University of Detroit for an additional year. After a stellar performance at
Detroit, where he average 32.1 points and 21.5 rebounds per game, Haywood decided to turn
pro. But due to the NBA’s requirement of 4 years of college, Haywood was not eligible.
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Therefore, he joined the Denver Rockets, who played in the American Basketball Association
(ABA), a competing professional basketball league (NBA.com: Spencer Haywood Bio, n.d.).
Haywood continued his excellent play in the ABA. He averaged 30 points per game
and 19.5 rebounds per game on his way to earning Rookie of the Year and MVP honors for
the 1969-1970 season. Even though he was still not eligible for the NBA, Haywood joined the
Seattle SuperSonics for the 1970-1971 season. The NBA once again said that he was not
eligible to play, and in response, the owner of the SuperSonics filed an anti-trust lawsuit
against the NBA, which turned into Haywood v. National Basketball Association. This case
went all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in a 7-2 ruling, the Court stated that
Haywood would be allowed to play. This launched a new policy by the NBA, stating that if a
player could prove a financial hardship, they could be given special consideration to be
eligible for the draft, even if they did not meet the criteria for eligibility (NBA.com: Spencer
Haywood Bio, n.d.).
As far as clearing the way for high school players to join the NBA, this decision did
not open the floodgates. In 1974 and 1975, a total of three players went straight from high
school to professional basketball, one to the ABA and two to the NBA. After these players, it
took 20 years for another high school player to be drafted. In 1995, Kevin Garnett was drafted
fifth overall by the Minnesota Timberwolves. Garnett would go on to have one of the most
successful careers ever, winning an NBA championship, All-Star and regular season MVP
Awards, and garnering 15 All-Star game selections. The following year, Kobe Bryant was
selected 13th overall by the Los Angeles Lakers. Bryant sits at third on the all-time scoring
list, with five NBA championships and two NBA Finals MVP trophies on his resume. These
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success stories led to an influx of high school players being drafted, reaching a high point in
the 2004 draft, where eight of the 29 first round picks were players out of high school (A look
at High School Players…, n.d.). This led to a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
being negotiated between the players’ union and the owners in 2005. The owners wanted to
have a minimum age of 20 for draft eligibility, and the players did not want any limit. The
final agreement was a minimum age of 19 years, which was only agreed upon after salary cap
changes in the players’ favor were put into place (NBA.com–CBA Principal Deal Points,
n.d.).
The new CBA, negotiated in 2011, did not change the minimum age of eligibility for
the draft, but it did call for the creation of a committee to discuss future changes. Thus, the
current draft eligibility rules are as follows: First, all players must be at least 19 years of age
during the calendar year of the draft. Second, if the player is from the United States, he must
be at least 1 year removed from graduating high school. Most players choose to go to college
and play basketball in the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA), which is the
governing body of all college sports. Others choose to play overseas, or join the
Developmental League (D-League) of the NBA to prepare for life in the NBA (Table of
Contents, n.d.).
The fact that for right now, and in the foreseeable future, high school players will not
be eligible to be drafted makes this analysis even more important. With the overwhelming
majority of players coming from the NCAA, being able to predict success that others might
not be able to see is a distinct advantage.
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PER and Win Shares
PER, or Player Efficiency Rating, is a statistic developed by John Hollinger, and it
encompasses nearly every aspect of a player’s production. The pertinent information about the
rating is as follows: an unadjusted PER is calculated using a large number of variables,
including points, rebounds, assists, field goals, free throws, turnovers, and three pointers, as
well as team and league statistics. This variable is then adjusted for the team’s pace, and
normalized to have an average of 15 (Calculating PER, n.d.).
PER has a rough scale which demonstrates how a player has produced in a given year:
A Year for the Ages: 35.0
Runaway MVP Candidate: 30.0
Strong MVP Candidate: 27.5
Weak MVP Candidate: 25.0
Bona fide All-Star: 22.5
Borderline All-Star: 20.0
Solid 2nd Option: 18.0
3rd Banana: 16.0
Pretty good player: 15.0
In the rotation: 13.0
Scrounging for minutes: 11.0
Definitely renting: 9.0
The Next Stop: D-League: 5.0 (Player efficiency rating, 2014)
Since PER can be calculated for a single season or for multiple seasons, the scale
provides a good guide as to just how productive a player has been over his career. As
mentioned earlier, Michael Jordan is widely considered the greatest to ever play the game,
and PER supports that claim. Jordan currently has the highest career PER at 27.91. LeBron
James, the number one pick in the 2003 draft and four time MVP, is second, with a career
PER of 27.76. There are only 62 players in the history of the NBA who have a career PER of
20.00 or higher.
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Calculated by “Calculating Win Shares” (2014), win shares (WS) represents how
much a player contributed to his team’s wins. Win shares is calculated as one game equaling
roughly one win share, so a team that won 50 games in a season would have approximately 50
win shares in that season. The calculations do not come out exact, but the average absolute
error for all teams since the 1962-63 season is 2.74 wins, with a root mean squared error of
3.41, which is relatively small compared to the 82 games. For example, the total win shares of
all players on the Oklahoma Thunder in the 2013-2014 season is 59.4. The team actually won
59 games, so the absolute error for that team is 0.4. Therefore, win shares is a decent
approximation of how much a player contributes to his team’s wins.
Sean Smith, a leader in baseball’s sabermetric movement, created a formula for win
shares that was quite simple, using only points, missed field goals, missed free throws,
rebounds, assists, blocks, steals, and turnovers. There are additional calculations to create
marginal points and team points per win, but the formula is essentially very straightforward.
This paper is using the Basketball Reference formula because it is more sophisticated, and all
of the data has come from the site.
Win shares is divided into two categories: offensive win shares, and defensive win
shares. Offensive win shares are calculated using points produced and offensive possessions.
Points produced is a metric that captures how a player contributes to scoring, primarily
through shooting, assists, and offensive rebounding (Points Produced Definition…, n.d.).
Offensive possessions are predicted for each player. An offensive possession will end when
(a) the team scores, (b) the team misses and the opponent gets the rebound, (c) the team turns
the ball over, or (d) shooting free throws and either making the last shot or not securing the
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offensive rebound. Using these numbers from a game, the total number of possessions can be
estimated for that game. This is then divided by two, and each team’s estimated possessions
are equal to the result. The ratio of a player’s minutes to the total minutes for the team in a
given season is multiplied by the team’s estimated possessions to get a player’s estimated
possessions (Oliver, 2011, pp. 343-349).
These are used to calculate something called marginal offense. The formula is:
(4) Marginal offense = (points produced) – 0.92*(league points per
possession)*(offensive possessions)
Another statistic, marginal points per win, is calculated using team and league pace.
Pace is an estimate of how many possessions a team will have within 48 minutes, or the
standard length of an NBA game. The league pace is an average of all teams. The formula is
as follows:
(5) Marginal points per win = 0.32*(league points per game)*((team pace)/(league
pace))
Finally, offensive win shares is the ratio of the two previous statistics:
(6) Offensive win shares = (marginal offense)/(marginal points per win)
Defensive win shares are calculated using Defensive Rating. Dr. Dean Oliver, an
author and statistician, devised formulas for both points produced and defensive rating. The
formula for defensive rating is:
(7) Defensive rating = (Opponents points allowed/Opponent’s possessions)*100
The marginal defense and marginal points per win are calculated, similar to the
offensive win shares. The final calculation for defensive win shares is:
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(8) Defensive win shares = (marginal defense)/(marginal points per win)
To calculate win shares, offensive and defensive win shares are added together. A
more detailed description of the formulas for win shares and PER can be found in Appendix
A. For example, in 2013, Kevin Durant, the MVP of the league, accumulated 14.8 offensive
win shares, and 4.4 defensive win shares, giving him 19.2 win shares for that season
(Calculating Win Shares, 2014).
In addition to win shares, which is an accumulation statistic, there is win shares per 48
minutes (WSP48), which is how many wins a player contributes over the length of an NBA
game. This is a rate statistic, and gives a better idea of how effective a player is on a per game
basis, instead of how long a player’s career was.
For example, Michael Jordan has the highest career win shares per 48 minutes, with
.2505, but is fourth all time with 214.02 win shares. This shows that Jordan was very effective
in his playing time, but did not have as long of a career as other superstars. Conversely,
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar is the all-time leader in win shares with 273.41, but is seventh in win
shares per 48 minutes at .2284. Since Abdul-Jabbar played 1,560 career games, and Jordan
played 1,072, Abdul-Jabbar would have more opportunities to accumulate win shares, but his
later years of his career brought down his win shares per 48 minutes. Over his final three
seasons, Abdul-Jabbar averaged win shares per 48 minutes of .148, .111, and .082.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
This paper will look at first round draft picks between 1985 and 2005. This time frame
was chosen because the beginning of the current draft lottery began in 1985, and because
most of the counting stats we use today (points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks) were
collected during college careers at this time. The endpoint of 2005 was chosen to allow
players chosen in 2005 to have a long enough career (9 years) that we will have a good idea
about how successful they have been in the NBA. College career statistics are used, including
points per minute (PPM), rebounds per minute (RPM), assists per minute (APM), steals per
minute (SPM), and blocks per minute (BPM). Additional information, such as All-American
honors and player of the year awards will be included in the analysis as dummy variables to
measure their significance.
Using PER as the primary dependent variable, a regression analysis of career PER on
college statistics was performed. Regression on career PER using the rookie year statistics for
each player was also conducted.
The big problem here is that PER does not necessarily translate into wins. According
to “FAQ” (2014), the coefficient of determination between PER and team wins is only 33%,
leaving two thirds of the variation in wins accounted for by different measurements. But one
new relationship we can look at is between PER and win shares. PER correlates nicely with
win shares, with a correlation coefficient of .699 for players in our sample. But the great
relationship is between PER and win shares per 48 minutes, which calculates how many win
shares a player contributes per 48 minutes of playing time. The correlation coefficient
between these variables is .877, which is extremely useful. Therefore, this paper will also
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perform regression analyses with win shares as the dependent variable and with win shares
per 48 minutes as our dependent variable. This will give a more valuable look, in terms of
wins, at which players to draft.
Initially, this paper will discuss the relevance of college statistics to predicting NBA
career success by doing a multiple linear regression on NBA career PER, WS, and WSP48
using college statistics. To validate the findings, PER, win shares, and win shares per 48
minutes of all of the players in our sample will be recorded and ranked to see where they
should have been drafted, based on those values. Additionally, the model will be used to
predict PER, win shares, and win shares per 48 minutes, and rank the players using those
values. Finally, the analysis will compare the actual order of the draft, the ideal order of the
draft, and our model’s order of the draft, and see if the models achieved a better measure of
future success.
This model can be tested using players drafted between 2006 and 2010, since they are
outside of the range of the sample. This will be the validation sample. Testing these years in
the validation sample will show how effectively or ineffectively teams are drafting in the
NBA draft. Ideally, NBA teams would be able to use the results found here to better plan and
prepare for upcoming drafts, knowing which variables are important and which are not.
The procedure was repeated, using rookie year statistics. After looking at the draft
from 1985-2005, the players from 2006 draft and beyond were the validation sample, using
the model to predict the PER, win shares, and win shares per 48 minutes of the top prospects,
and ranking them accordingly. These rankings can be compared to the “ideal” rankings, where
the first player chosen has the highest PER, second player chosen has the second highest PER,
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and so on. If the model does a better job predicting the success in the careers of these
prospects, it can be conclude that there is a better way to prepare for the NBA draft.
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Chapter 5: Data Description
The data collected for this study is very extensive. All first and second round draft
picks between 1985 and 2005 were compiled, totaling 1152 observations. All data was
collected from www.basektball-reference.com, an exhaustive database of basketball statistics.
Each observation included 221 variables, including NBA total stats, per game stats, per 36
minute stats, per 100 possession stats, and advanced metrics. Those same stats were collected
on the rookie year in the NBA, and the playoffs in the NBA. In addition, the NCAA total stats
and per game stats are collected. To handle players on teams that did not make the NCAA
tournament, a Tournament Seed of 17 was entered. This ensured that data was available for all
players. There are also descriptive variables, such as flag variables for All-Rookie, All-NBA,
and All-Defensive Teams, Rookie of the Year, Most Valuable Player, Defensive Player of the
Year, Most Improved Player, Sixth Man of the Year, All-Star, All-Star MVP, Player of the
Week, and Player of the Month. College descriptive variables include Made NCAA
Tournament, Made Final Four, National Championship, AP All American Team, USBWA
Player of the Year, AP Player of the Year, Helms Player of the Year, Naismith Player of the
Year, Sporting News Player of the Year, UPI Player of the Year, NABC Defensive Player of
the Year, NABC Player of the Year, Wooden Award Winner, USBWA Freshman of the Year,
NCAA Tournament Most Outstanding Player, Rupp Player of the Year, and NIT Most
Valuable Player. There is also a flag for McDonald’s All American, a high school award.
Out of the 1152 total players, 163 did not play NCAA basketball. Of the 163, 39 came
to the NBA directly out of high school, 115 were players playing in foreign countries, and 9
came from junior college or community college. Also out of the 1152 total players, 162 have
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never played in the NBA. Since our sample requires NBA players with NCAA experience,
players who played internationally, went straight from high school to the NBA, or have never
played in the NBA were eliminated. Considering some players would have neither NCAA
experience nor NBA experience, there is a bit of overlap in these groups. Finally, players who
played at the Division II or Division III level were removed. This resulted in 841 players who
had both an NCAA Division I and an NBA career.
There are some obvious differences between the two rounds right away. Before the
filtering, there were 575 first round picks and 577 second round picks. After stripping away
those without NBA or NCAA experience, the sample consists of 487 first round picks and
354 second round picks. As has been proven by other studies, a first round pick has a much
higher chance of having an NBA career than a second round pick.
Getting into the numbers, the average PER for all players in our sample is 12.29 with a
standard deviation of 5.16. Dividing into the two rounds, the first round has an average PER
of 13.43 with a standard deviation of 3.67, while the second round has an average PER of
10.71 with a standard deviation of 6.31. This shows that the first round has a significantly
higher PER, with much less variability than the second round. Using the medians tells a
similar story, with the first round picks having a median PER of 13.6, and the second round
having a median PER of 10.85.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48 Minutes

Min

Max

841
841

WHOLE SAMPLE
Standard
Mean
Median
Deviation
12.29
5.16
12.40
21.97
30.63
9.4

-22.1
-1.6

76.1
234.6

841

.062

.069

-.638

1.442

Median

Min

Max

13.6
21.3

-4.5
-1.6

26.4
234.6

.081

-.326

.250

N
PER
Win Shares
Win Shares
per 48
minutes

487
487

FIRST ROUND
Standard
Mean
Deviation
13.43
3.67
31.39
34.91

487

.075

N
PER
Win Shares
Win Shares
per 48
minutes

.056

Min

Max

354
354

SECOND ROUND
Standard
Mean
Median
Deviation
10.71
6.38
10.85
9.01
16.23
1.00

-22.1
-1.3

76.1
108.9

354

.043

-.638

1.442

N
PER
Win Shares
Win Shares
per 48
minutes

.098

.134

.047

Whereas PER follows a relatively normal distribution, WS has a right skewed
distribution. This makes sense when the process of how each measurement is calculated is
considered. PER is a normalized variable with 15 being the league average by design. WS is
an accumulated variable, and while players can have negative WS, most teams would not hold
onto a player long enough for them to collect a large amount of negative win shares.
Therefore, WS is practically left censored at 0, and is not limited on the right (see
Appendix B).
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Once again, it is shown that the first round players out-produce second round players.
This time, the first round has a higher standard deviation in WS, which means it is much more
volatile than the second round. This is due to the distribution being right skewed, and the fact
that no second round pick in our sample has had more than 108.9 WS. So in this case, the
variability is a positive aspect. It is also interesting to note that the median WS for a second
round player who played in the NBA is 1.00, which is an absolutely miniscule amount.
As for WSP48, we can see that it follows a relatively normal distribution; similar to
PER (See Appendix B). The variability for WSP48 is also much higher for second round
picks than first round picks. This whole image shows that first round picks are more likely to
have higher PER’s, WS, and WSP48 than second round picks, and with less variability for
PER and WSP48.
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Chapter 6: Analysis
College Statistics
The first analysis completed for this study was looking at college statistics regressed
against NBA career PER. Certain variables were not available for a large amount of players,
and have been subsequently eliminated from the analysis. Those include three pointers (made,
attempted, percentage), minutes (total and per game), and turnovers and personal fouls (total
and per game). Table 2 shows the results from that analysis.
These results were compiled using a forward selection method, whereby each variable
is added to the formula, and if, at that time, the variable’s p-value is not less than 0.15, it will
not be brought into the equation. For PER, the formula ended up with 10 significant variables,
and WS and WSP48 had 14 and 6 significant variables, respectively.
The analysis shows that there are several significant variables in predicting success at
the NBA level. On all three regressions (PER, WS, and WSP48), field goal percentage was
significant and the coefficient was positive. This shows that an increase in college field goal
percentage leads to a higher PER, WS, and WSP48 in the NBA. It is also interesting that a
player’s team’s tournament seed was significant in each of the regressions, supporting the
idea that great players will make their teams great. It also makes sense that the best teams
recruit the best players, and will therefore have the higher seeds in the tournament.
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Table 2
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, Full Sample (N = 813)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

Intercept

3.126(2.016)
-51.81(11.054)
-0.1096(0.0511)
Field Goals Made
0(0.006)
Field Goals Attempted
0.021***(0.007)
Field Goal Percentage
6.871*(3.715)
67.229***(19.93)
0.1625**(0.0689)
Free Throw Percentage
0.064(0.0417)
Rebounds
0.0001**(0.0001)
Assists
0.013***(0.004)
0.0003***(0.0001)
Steals
-0.065(0.183)
Blocks
0.142***(0.04)
0.0003*(0.0001)
Points Per Game
0.149*(0.081)
Rebounds Per Game
0.14(0.097)
1.154**(0.53)
Assists Per Game
2.969***(0.782)
Steals Per Game
0.767**(0.347)
11.641*(5.934)
Blocks Per Game
0.627***(0.225)
Tournament Seed
-0.102***(0.033)
-0.467**(0.182)
-0.0011*(0.0006)
st
1 Team All-American
1.113**(0.5)
13.079***(3.082)
AP Player of the Year
34.912***(9.054)
NABC Defensive Player
10.723**(4.865)
of the Year
NABC Player of the Year
-20.179**(8.373)
USBWA Freshman of the
2.114(1.374)
15.07*(7.678)
Year
NIT Most Valuable
17.074*(9.569)
Player
Summary Statistics
R2
.117
.257
.050
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.

One of the biggest trends was that the per-game results were very significant for the
PER regression, whereas the counting totals were significant for the WSP48. It could have
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been guessed that the per-game stats would have been significant for the WSP48 as well,
since it not a cumulative statistic, but a rate statistic.
Since there has been such a marked difference between the first and second round
picks, especially in the standard deviation for PER, WS, and WSP48, it would be beneficial to
split the dataset into the first and second rounds and repeat the same regression analysis. The
tables are located in Appendix C.
When broken down by round, it is evident that the first round is much easier to
predict. Once again, field goal percentage is significant on all three analyses, and has a
positive coefficient. Also, blocks and 1st team All-American are significant across all three.
This matches with the findings of Coates and Oguntimein (2008), who found scoring
efficiency and blocks to have a positive correlation on predicting draft position. There are
several players drafted very highly that most likely contribute to these positive correlations,
such as David Robinson (1987 draft, #1 pick), Shaquille O’Neal (1992, #1), and Tim Duncan
(1997, #1). These were all 7 footers who shot very high percentages and had high block totals
in college, also all making 1st team All-American at least once. All of these players
accumulated a PER of at least 24, total win shares of 175 or more, and win shares per 48 of at
least .200, all of which are extremely high. These players help skew the significance of
blocks, field goal percentage, and 1st team All-American.
The first analysis with PER as the dependent variable shows that steals, blocks,
rebounds per game, assists per game, 1st team All-American, AP Player of the Year, and
USBWA Freshman of the Year are significant, and all have positive coefficients. Coates and
Oguntimein (2008) also found blocks, assists, and rebounds per game positive and significant
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in their analysis for predicting draft position. Since their sample was contained inside of the
one used in this paper, this is an encouraging sign. No team statistics were significant at any
level, implying that a player’s success can be predicted solely with their numbers in college.
As for the win shares analysis, 1st team All-American, AP Player of the Year, NABC
Defensive Player of the Year, and NABC Player of the Year are significant, and all but the
NABC Player of the Year are positive. This could be attributed to Shawn Respert and Jay
Williams, winners of the award in 1995 and 2002, respectively. These players won the NABC
POY award, but not many other prestigious awards, such as AP POY. Both players had very
disappointing careers, with neither accumulating a PER above 13, more than 2.5 win shares,
or win shares per 48 minutes above 0.050.
In the third regression, the only accolade that is significant is 1st team All-American.
The remaining variables are field goals made, field goal percentage, points, rebounds, assists,
blocks, and steals per game, all of which have positive coefficients with the exception of field
goals made. This equation actually had a significantly lower R2 than the other two, with only
11.49% of the variance in NBA WSP48 being explained by college variables.
With such diversity in the statistics between all of the different positions in basketball,
it seemed beneficial to separate the 1st round by position, and create a regression analysis for
each data set. The results from this are located in Appendix D, Tables C through G. Here, a
similar pattern in terms of coefficients of determination can be seen, as they range from 0.139
to 0.222 for point guards, shooting guards, and small forwards. But for power forwards, the
equation for WS has an R2 of 0.385, significantly higher than the other positions. Centers,
however, show the greatest improvement. The WS equation for centers has an R2 of 0.645, or
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nearly two-thirds of the variance. This is a drastic improvement, and shows the centers and
power forwards are considerably easier to predict than point guards, shooting guards, or small
forwards.
Point guards had very few variables that were actually significant. In the WS equation,
for example, the only two variables are rebounds (0.207 parameter estimate), and assists per
game (7.113). WSP48 isn’t much better, with only 2nd team All-American (-0.048) and 3rd
team All-American (-0.0416) being significant. No individual statistics are relevant to
predicting NBA success. This leads to the conclusion that point guards are very difficult to
project, and there aren’t many differentiating college factors between good NBA point guards
and bad NBA point guards.
As for shooting guards, the only variable to be significant across all three equations
was assists per game. All coefficients were positive, which means that a shooting guard who
is adept at passing the ball has a better chance of becoming a productive player in the NBA.
Assists are also relevant for small forwards, as that is the only variable to be significant across
all three equations at that position. Once again, all coefficients are positive. The general
takeaway is that when dealing with either a shooting guard or a small forward, assists is the
most indicative factor of future success.
The one variable significant for all three equations for power forward is AP Player of
the Year, which is positive for all three. NABC Defensive Player of the Year is significant for
WS and WSP48, which shows that, historically, the best power forwards in the country in the
NCAA will go on to have success in the NBA. Another interesting item to note is that this
was the first position where team record became significant. Team Losses and Conference
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Winning Percentage are significant for PER and WS. No other position had been influenced
by team success. This could mean that good power forwards make their teams better, or just
that good power forwards have come from historically successful teams.
Weight is a very significant variable for centers, as all three equations have negative
coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 level. Historically, heavier centers have performed
worse than lighter centers. There are obvious exceptions to this (Shaquille O’Neal at 325
pounds is an obvious example), but the overall trend has been towards lighter centers
performing better. This could be due to a stamina issue, as the heavier a player is, the more
likely he is to wear down faster.
For the predicting of draft order, both equations (1st round as a whole, and 1st round
broken out by position) will be used to see which one does the better job.
The analysis for second round shows why most teams consider second round picks to
be like lottery tickets. There are only three significant variables among all three analyses, all
in the WS equation. Additionally, none of the regression equations are significant, even at
α=.10. In light of these facts, the remaining analysis will look at the first round picks only.
Rookie Year Statistics
The first round of regression analysis showed that there is a relationship between a
player’s college career and their professional career. But the amount of variance determined
by the college statistics was not very high. In fact, other than the equations for power
forwards and centers, the highest R2 of any of the regression analyses was .222, or just over
one fifth of the variance explained. So, some of what makes a successful NBA player can be
determined, but can any information after the first year of NBA experience be gained?
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Using the same methods as the regression with college variables, the formula used
many available metrics from a player’s rookie year, including games, minutes (total and per
game), points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, turnovers, personal fouls (total, per game, and
per 36 minutes), field goals, three pointers, free throws (made, attempted, percentage), PER,
Win Shares (offensive, defensive, total), Win Shares per 48 minutes, Rookie of the Month,
All-Rookie 1st team and All-Rookie 2nd team. The results are included in Appendix E, Tables
H through M.
There has been a plethora of information gained after one year in the NBA. Starting
with the PER regression, weight, draft position, games, free throw percentage, steals, personal
fouls, personal fouls per game, steals per 36 minutes, PER, offensive win shares, and
defensive win shares are all significant at some level, with draft position, games, steals,
personal fouls, steals per 36 minutes, PER, and defensive win shares significant at the 1%
level. This shows that a player who is a high draft pick, plays a large amount of games, and
has a high PER in their rookie season will probably have a higher career PER. Figure 1 shows
the relationship between rookie year PER and career PER. This may not be earth-shattering
news, but it does give insight into what GM’s should be looking at when evaluating potential
trades. What does help as well is that the R2 has increased to .634, compared to .207 using
only college variables.
The vast outlier in Figure 1 is courtesy of Yinka Dare, a center drafted 14th in 1994.
Dare played only one game in his rookie season, and was in that game for three minutes. He
missed his only shot attempt, and committed one turnover and two fouls to go along with one
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rebound. This led to his rookie year PER to be an astronomically bad -33.9, which drastically
skews the graph.
Similarly, an increase in R2 for the WS regression is observed. For using college stats,
R2 = .213, and using rookie year stats, R2 = .487. In this analysis, there was draft position,
games, personal fouls, turnovers per game, defensive win shares, and win shares being
significant at some level. Draft position, personal fouls, turnovers per game, and win shares
are significant at the 1% level.

Figure 1
Scatterplot of Rookie Year PER against Career PER with Regression Line
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In the WSP48 regression, a large amount of information is gained as well. The R2 goes
from .1149 with college stats to .559 with rookie year stats. Significant variables include draft
position, games, free throw percentage, personal fouls, steals per game, personal fouls per
game, steals per 36 minutes, win shares, and win shares per 48 minutes. With such a high R2,
these variables tell quite a bit about how efficient a player will be throughout their career. The
relationship between rookie WSP48 and career WSP48 is shown in Figure 2.
Similar to Figure 1, there is an extreme outlier; or in fact two, in this case. The most
extreme is once again attributed to Yinka Dare, courtesy of his 3-minute-long rookie season.
His WSP48 that season was -0.736. The second player was Troy Bell, the 16th pick in 2003.
Bell played in six games, totaling 34 minutes. His abysmal shooting was the source of the low
WSP48, as he was 4-18 from the field (22.2%), and 0-4 on three point attempts. This,
combined with relatively high rates of fouls and turnovers, led to a WSP48 of -0.326. Without
these two individuals, the relationship looks much stronger.
The analysis by position is even better, as far as R2 goes. For the center position
equation for WS, the coefficient of determination is 0.824. This agrees with the college
variables in that centers are the easiest to predict success. Conversely, the point guard WS
regression equation has a coefficient of determination of only 0.405. Predicting success for
point guards does not get much easier, even with a season of experience to analyze.
Due to the fact that PER was not necessarily correlated strongly with wins, and since
wins have a higher correlation to WSP48, this paper will be using WSP48 as the primary
variable in the following section of analysis.
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Figure 2
Scatterplot of Rookie Year WSP48 against Career WSP48 with Regression Line
Predicting Draft Order
This is the most interesting part of the whole process. Using all variables that were
significant at the 10% level, the paper predicted a player’s WSP48 with both college variables
and rookie year variables. From the perspective of a GM, the ability to predict a player’s
success before he is drafted is extremely important, but the ability to re-evaluate all players
after one year in the NBA to determine which players are most likely to be successful is just
as crucial. This will determine what players they pursue in free agency and through trades.
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The first analysis will look at re-ranking each draft based on the predicted value of
WSP48 using college variables. The model with all 1st round players will be referred to as
Model 1, or M1, and the model split apart by position will be referred to as Model 2, or M2.
Since exact predictions are not possible, this paper focused on ranking the players in relation
to one another, comparing the predicted order of the draft with the ideal order. The ideal order
is the ranking from largest to smallest of career WSP48. The 1985 draft is shown in Table 3 to
illustrate this point.
Another issue was dealing with foreign and high school players. The decision was
made to not use a player’s actual draft pick, but where they were drafted out of those who
attended college. This made it easy to compare all three rankings.
Some pretty interesting things are observed from this table. The biggest question was
how well the formula would predict Karl Malone, who was chosen 13th overall, but ended up
with one of the best careers of all time. Unfortunately, the M1 ranking had him 11th out of
players attending college, which is only one spot above where he was chosen in the actual
draft, and M2 had him ranked 8th. But the equations did predict correctly that A.C. Green
should have been chosen higher than the last pick of the draft. His actual WSP48 rank is 5th,
and his M1 and M2 predicted ranks were 7th and 6th, respectively, much better than the 22nd
where he was actually selected.
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Table 3
1985 NBA Draft with Ideal Ranking and Predicted Ranking

Name
Ewing, Patrick
Tisdale, Wayman
Benjamin, Benoit
McDaniel, Xavier
Koncak, Jon
Kleine, Joe
Mullin, Chris
Schrempf, Detlef
Pinckney, Ed
Lee, Keith
Green, Kenny
Malone, Karl
Hughes, Alfredrick
Rasmussen, Blair
Wennington, Bill
Blab, Uwe
Dumars, Joe
Harris, Steve
Vincent, Sam
Catledge, Terry
Reynolds, Jerry
Green, A.C.

Draft NBA
Ideal
Pred. WSP48 Rank
Pred. WSP48 Rank
Pick
WSP48 Rank
(M1)
(M1)
(M2)
(M2)
.177
1
1
.150
3
.163
1
.088
9
2
.092
8
.115
2
.108
4
3
.072
14
.112
3
.129
2
4
.091
9
.089
6
.086
10
5
.085
11
.085
8
.061
20
6
.062
17
.067
14
.095
7
7
.139
4
.091
5
.125
3
8
.156
2
.070
10
.104
5
9
.130
6
.112
4
.064
19
10
.062
16
.069
13
.065
18
11
-.022
21
.047
20
.088
8
12
.205
1
.069
11
.034
22
13
-.029
22
.023
22
.069
16
14
.080
12
.046
21
.076
14
15
.087
10
.079
9
.079
12
16
.009
20
.062
16
.073
15
17
.118
7
.057
17
.069
17
18
.053
19
.067
15
.046
21
19
.069
15
.055
18
.080
11
20
.074
13
.054
19
.077
13
21
.060
18
.069
12
.097
6
22
.131
5
.086
7

Naturally, there must be a way to determine if the predicted draft order is better than
the actual draft order. The initial attempt was to look at the absolute value of the difference
between the predicted and ideal pick, and compare that to the absolute value of the difference
between the actual and ideal pick. These would then be totaled for each draft, and the smallest
total would be the most effective order. In addition, the differences were squared, and added
up as well. This gives two good measurements of the effectiveness of the predicting. The first
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measurement does not punish for a large miss, but the second measurement does. For
example, if a player’s ideal pick was 10, they were actually picked 5th, but the predicted pick
was 20th, the absolute value of the differences would be 5 and 10, respectively. This would
not be a large difference. But the squared differences would be 25 and 100, resulting in a
much larger disparity. So the second measurement will be looked at to see how many “large”
misses occurred.
This also allows the calculation of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which is a
measurement of dependence between two variables. It is a non-parametric measurement,
which means it does not require any assumptions about our data. The resulting value will be
between -1 and 1, which will tell us the magnitude and the direction of the relationship
between the variables. Using our sample size per each year, n, and the actual and predicted
values, the Spearman coefficient can be calculated with the following formula:

(9)
di2 is the difference between the two observations. In this case, there were three sets of
data to calculate the Spearman coefficient: the actual vs. the ideal, the M1 predicted vs. the
ideal, and the M2 predicted vs. the ideal.
Table 4 shows the differences and squared differences between the actual, ideal, and
predicted ranks, as well as the Spearman coefficient for each ranking.
The results of the first year in the study are very promising, with the M1 predicted rank
having a sum of error of 98 and the M2 predicted rank totaling 82, while the actual draft had a
sum of error of 142. The same held true for the squared differences. This is illustrated by the
six picks that were at least 10 spots away from where the ideal ranking was for that player,
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compared to only three such picks for the M1 predicted ranks, and one for M2. There was also
one predicted rank that matched the ideal ranks exactly for each model. Table 5 shows the
summary of the rest of the years in our sample. Overall, the model rankings did a better job
predicting, in winning more by years, by total differences, and with higher Spearman
coefficient’s in more years, even though the model’s R2 was only .1149. M1 had a higher
Spearman coefficient in 14 out of the 21 years in the sample, whereas M2 had a higher
coefficient in only 12 of 21 years. The sum of the years for M1 was the lowest out of all three,
meaning that the equation from all 1st round players was more effective at predicting WSP48
than Model 2.
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Table 4
1985 Draft–Absolute Value of Differences and Differences Squared of Ideal Rank and Model
Ranks

Name

Draft
Pick
(d)

Ideal
Rank
(i)

ABS
of (di)

(d-i)2

ABS of
(m1-i)

M1

(m-i)2

ABS of
(m2-i)

M2

(m2-i)2

Ewing, Patrick

1

3

2

4

1

2

4

1

2

4

Tisdale, Wayman

2

8

6

36

2

6

36

9

1

1

Benjamin, Benoit

3

14

11

121

3

11

121

4

10

100

McDaniel, Xavier

4

9

5

25

6

3

9

2

7
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Koncak, Jon

5

11

6

36

8

3

9

10

1

1

Kleine, Joe

6

17

11

121

14

3

9

20

3

9

Mullin, Chris

7

4

3

9

5

1

1

7

3

9

Schrempf, Detlef

8

2

6

36

10

8

64

3

1

1

Pinckney, Ed

9

6

3

9

4

2

4

5

1

1

Lee, Keith

10

16

6

36

13

3

9

19

3

9

Green, Kenny

11

21

10

100

20

1

1

18

3

9

Malone, Karl

12

1

11

121

11

10

100

8

7
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Hughes, Alfredrick

13

22

9

81

22

0

0

22

0

0

Rasmussen, Blair

14

12

2

4

21

9

81

16

4

16

Wennington, Bill

15

10

5

25

9

1

1

14

4

16

Blab, Uwe

16

20

4

16

16

4

16

12

8

64

Dumars, Joe

17

7

10

100

17

10

100

15

8

64

Harris, Steve

18

19

1

1

15

4

16

17

2

4

Vincent, Sam

19

15

4

16

18

3

9

21

6

36

Catledge, Terry

20

13

7

49

19

6

36

11

2

4

Reynolds, Jerry

21

18

3

9

12

6

36

13

5

25

Green, A.C.

22

5

17

289

7

2

4

6

1

1

142

1244

98

666

82

472

Sum
Spearman
coefficient

0.298

0.624

0.733
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Table 5
Summary of Differences and Squared Differences between Ideal, Actual, and Predicted
Rankings of WSP48, by Year (College Statistics)

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Sum of [ABS(d-i)]2 with
Sum of [ABS(m1-i)]2 with
Sum of [ABS(m2-i)]2 with
Spearman
Spearman
Spearman
1244 (0.298)
666 (0.624)
472 (0.733)
1374 (0.108)
850 (0.448)
1166 (0.243)
1016 (0.426)
1400 (0.209)
1330 (0.249)
910 (0.650)
1840 (0.292)
1514 (0.418)
1772 (0.318)
1841 (0.292)
1786 (0.313)
2381 (0.273)
1690 (0.484)
1885 (0.425)
1478 (0.432)
1482 (0.430)
1802 (0.307)
1674 (0.489)
1552 (0.526)
1392 (0.575)
2992 (0.087)
2322 (0.291)
2078 (0.366)
2270 (0.307)
3090 (0.057)
2454 (0.251)
3268 (0.106)
2518 (0.311)
2322 (0.365)
1084 (0.388)
1156 (0.347)
1424 (0.196)
1292 (0.558)
1014 (0.653)
2076 (0.290)
1336 (0.419)
1120 (0.513)
902 (0.608)
836 (0.528)
764 (0.569)
1494 (0.156)
1760 (0.130)
1032 (0.490)
1192 (0.411)
898 (0.212)
694 (0.391)
482 (0.577)
964 (0.275)
846 (0.364)
536 (0.597)
522 (0.360)
428 (0.475)
228 (0.721)
488 (0.129)
574 (-0.025)
458 (0.182)

2005

1638 (0.191)

1214 (0.400)

1936 (0.043)

Total SS

31197

28093

28929

To validate these findings, the formula was applied to players from the first round of
the draft between 2006 and 2010. Since most of these players are still in the NBA and thus,
their careers are not over, this validation is not ideal, but it will still give an idea if the
predictions are holding up over time. Results are located in Table 6. Similar results occur in
our validation sample. All 5 years have a higher Spearman coefficient for the M1 than the
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actual ranking. M2, however, does a terrible job, and only has a higher Spearman coefficient
in one of the five years. In three out of the five years, the Spearman coefficient is greater than
0.5 for M1, indicating that the predicted rank has a strong correlation with the ideal rank. It is
amazing how well this model works in predicting a draft’s ranking by WSP48, given its low
R2 .
Given the fairly low coefficients of determination, it is surprising that the model does
a superior job of predicting rankings of the draft. Since there has been this level of success, it
can be expected that the rankings using the rookie year information will be much closer to the
ideal rankings than the actual rankings.
Table 6
Summary of Differences and Squared Differences between Ideal, Actual, and Predicted
Rankings of WSP48 in Validation Sample, by Year (College Statistics)

Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total SS

Sum of [ABS(d-i)]2 with Sum of [ABS(m1-i)]2 with
Sum of [ABS(m2-i)]2 with
Spearman
Spearman
Spearman
1600 (0.304)
1040 (0.548)
1550 (0.326)
1326 (0.490)
1083 (0.583)
1964 (0.245)
2648 (0.095)
2134 (0.270)
3040 (-0.039)
1808 (0.214)
978 (0.575)
2158 (0.062)
2774 (0.317)
10156

2054 (0.494)
7289

3188 (0.215)
11900

Again, the formulas will be predicting the rankings of the draft using WSP48 for the
1985 draft through the 2005 draft, and will be validating those results with the 2006 through
2010 drafts. The results using WSP48 are located in Table 7.
Here, the rookie year model does a significantly better job than how the actual draft picks
went. M1 performed better in 20 of the 21 years, and M2 had a higher coefficient for every
single year. On top of that, M2’s coefficient was higher than M1 in 15 of the 21 years,
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implying that the model by position does a much better job of predicting success after a
player’s rookie year. The Spearman coefficients were also incredibly high for some years. In
1987, the coefficient for M2 was 0.932, nearly a perfect correlation. For the 2003 draft, the
Spearman coefficient for M1 was .944. The biggest difference was for Dwayne Wade, who
should have been the first college player taken off the board, but was predicted 5th by the
model. With the exception of Wade and Mike Sweetney, who is 7th in WSP48 but predicted
4th by the model, all players were predicted within two spots of their ideal rank. This is
absolutely crucial information for GM’s to be able to determine which players they will want
to acquire, and which players they will want to avoid. It will also help prevent a team from
holding on to a player just because they invested a high draft pick into them. If there is
evidence that a player will not be successful, a franchise needs to move on from them,
regardless of what they initially thought they would be getting from that player.
Additionally, the M1 ranking is the best in all 5 years of the validation sample for
WSP48 (Table 8). Each of the Spearman coefficients are greater than 0.5 for M1, with four of
the coefficients north of 0.7. M2 does a good job as well, but does not have a higher
coefficient than M1 in any of the years. However, M2 does have a higher coefficient than the
actual draft order in every year.
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Table 7
Summary of Differences and Squared Differences between Ideal, Actual, and Predicted
Rankings of WSP48, by Year (Rookie Year Statistics)
[ABS(d-i)]2 with Spearman

Year

[ABS(m1-i)]2 with Spearman

[ABS(m2-i)]2 with Spearman

1985

1244 (0.298)

1072 (0.395)

550 (0.689)

1986

1374 (0.108)

604 (0.608)

612 (0.602)

1987

1016 (0.426)

282 (0.841)

120 (0.932)

1988

910 (0.650)

902 (0.653)

810 (0.688)

1989

1772 (0.318)

1328 (0.489)

938 (0.639)

1990

2381 (0.273)

825 (0.748)

1000 (0.695)

1991

1478 (0.432)

674 (0.741)

618 (0.762)

1992

1674 (0.489)

1856 (0.433)

1452 (0.557)

1993

2992 (0.087)

1548 (0.527)

1210 (0.631)

1994

2270 (0.307)

1438 (0.561)

1242 (0.621)

1995

3268 (0.106)

860 (0.765)

888 (0.757)

1996

1084 (0.388)

884 (0.501)

562 (0.683)

1997

1292 (0.558)

1138 (0.611)

812 (0.722)

1998

1336 (0.419)

786 (0.658)

582 (0.747)

1999

836 (0.528)

242 (0.863)

310 (0.825)

2000

1760 (0.130)

934 (0.539)

1016 (0.498)

2001

898 (0.212)

332 (0.709)

154 (0.865)

2002

964 (0.275)

412 (0.690)

320 (0.759)

2003

522 (0.360)

46 (0.944)

108 (0.868)

2004

488 (0.129)

292 (0.479)

192 (0.657)

2005

1638 (0.191)

618 (0.695)

586 (0.710)

31197

17073

14082

Total SS

With the knowledge that the validation sample supports the formulas from our sample,
it can be concluded with some certainty that these models will be successful in the future,
even with the changing landscape of the NBA. Granted, this is using data after the draft to
re-predict the draft, essentially. So the following section discusses the effect of predicting the
draft ranking of the top prospects of the NBA draft, without knowing where they actually
went.
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Table 8
Summary of Differences and Squared Differences between Ideal, Actual, and Predicted
Rankings of PER, WS, and WSP48, by year (Rookie Year Statistics)

Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Sum of [ABS(d-i)]2 with
Sum of [ABS(m1-i)]2 with
Sum of [ABS(m2-i)]2 with
Spearman
Spearman
Spearman
1600 (0.304)
462 (0.799)
594 (0.742)
1326 (0.490)
576 (0.778)
836 (0.678)
2648 (0.095)
1328 (0.546)
1954 (0.332)
1808 (0.214)
682 (0.703)
726 (0.684)
2774 (0.317)
966 (0.762)
1312 (0.677)

Total SS

10156

4014

5422

Predicting All Draftees
Since it is not known who will be a first round pick before the draft, there is no way of
just taking the first round picks and arranging them based on the model. So the logical next
step would be to include all of the top prospects heading into the draft, rank them with the
models, and compare that to how they all fared.
The year 2009 was chosen because that was the first year that data is available for the
top 100 prospects going into the draft. There is a “Big Board” of the top 100 prospects, both
college and international, for the 2009 NBA draft (Smith, 2009). Of these 100, 17 were
international players, and one played Division II basketball. This left 82 players who played
Division I NCAA basketball. Since 34 of these players did not play in the NBA, there is no
way to tell where they should have been drafted. But we can look at the predicted rankings
and determine which draft round that translates to, and compare that to the predicted draft
round of our formula.

54
Considering the proportion of international/non-Division I players in the prospects, the
college players were grouped into top 25, 26-50, and 50+, with top 25 roughly representing 1st
round pick, 26-50 roughly representing 2nd round pick, and 50+ being undrafted. With three
unranked players having played in the NBA beginning that year, there are 85 players in this
sample.
Visually, the best way to compare the predicted draft round with the actual draft round
is with a 3x3 table. Along the top is the predicted draft rank, and along the side is the actual
draft round. There are three tables comparing pre-draft rankings: M1 vs. Actual, M2 vs.
Actual, and Big Board vs. Actual. Table 9 shows the three comparisons.
Table 9
3X3 Tables of M1, M2, and Pre-Draft Predicted Ranks vs. Actual Draft Round, 2009
M1
Actual

Pred
1st
2nd
Not Drafted

M2
Actual

26-50

50+

13
9
3

7
4
14

4
11
20

24
24
37

25

25

35

85

1-25

26-50

50+

11
8
6

4
8
12

9
7
19

24
24
37

25

25

35

85

1-25

26-50

50+

21
4
0

3
11
11

0
9
26

24
24
37

25

25

35

85

Pred
1st
2nd
Not Drafted

Pre-Draft
Actual

1-25

Pred
1st
2nd
Not Drafted
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The Big Board does a very good job of predicting 1st round picks, 2nd round picks, and
undrafted players. Since all other factors are taken into account (conference, physical
measurements, intangibles, etc.), and the fact that teams only interview certain players, it is
likely that these rankings will be fairly close to what actually happens. So comparing M1 to
M2, M1 does a markedly better job in determining the future. There are far fewer extreme
misses (i.e., a 1st round draft pick that is predicted to be undrafted by the model, or an
undrafted player being predicted to go in the top 25, denoted in red in the table), and a higher
rate of correct 1st round predictions.
Now for the players that did play in the NBA, but were not drafted, we can perform a
similar analysis to the Spearman analysis, but we must now estimate the draft position of
those players that were not drafted. Using the Big Board pre-draft rankings seemed like a
good way to rank those players. There were 41 players taken in the 1st or 2nd round of the
draft, so the highest ranked player on the Big Board not picked in the draft would receive a
rank of 42, the next highest ranked player would get a rank of 43, and so on. In all, there were
50 players in 2009 that were either drafted and played, or signed as a free agent with a team.
This ranking was used along with the M1 and M2 predicted rankings for the players. Each of
these rankings was then compared against the “ideal” ranking of the players, based on their
career WSP48. The differences were squared and summed, and the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient was calculated for each comparison. Table 10 on the following page shows the
results, as well as the results from the initial analysis for 2009 on page 49.
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Table 10
Summary of Differences and Squared Differences between Ideal, Actual, and Predicted
Rankings of WSP48, 2009 (College Statistics)
Sum of [ABS(d-i)]2 with
Spearman

Year
2009 (Top
Prospects) n=50
2009 (First
round picks)
n=24

Sum of [ABS(m1-i)]2 with
Spearman

Sum of [ABS(m2-i)]2 with
Spearman

15802 (0.241)

13837 (0.336)

17602 (0.155)

1808 (0.214)

978 (0.575)

2158 (0.062)

Marked with yellow, M1 did the best job relative to the “ideal” position the players
should have been chosen in, ranked by WSP48. M2 did worse than the actual draft order,
which agrees with the results from the large sample analysis, where M1 is the superior choice
in predicting draft order. The Spearman coefficient is nearly the same for the draft vs. ideal
(0.241 and 0.214), while the M2 vs. ideal Spearman coefficient improves significantly (0.062
to 0.155). The M1 vs. ideal Spearman coefficient, while experiencing a large drop (0.575 to
0.336), is still the best method of the three for predicting success by WSP48. These results
confirm the model M1 as an adequate, and potentially advanced, prediction tool to use when
evaluating NBA prospects.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Certain aspects of college players’ careers have been highlighted by this paper as
significant in predicting future success. Field goal percentage, blocks, and 1st team AllAmerican were significant variables across all three initial analyses, indicating that talented
centers have dominated the sport across these two decades. For each 1st team All-American a
player makes in college, they can expect their career PER to be 1.32 higher than a player who
did not make the 1st team. That player’s career Win Shares will also be 14.123 higher, and
Win Shares per 48 minutes will be .0181 higher for every 1st team they make. With the advent
of the pace and space offense, and the emphasis placed on three point shooting, it will be
interesting to see whether this trend continues.
The ability to predict the rest of a player’s career based on their rookie season statistics
has been proven by this study. Variables such as draft position, games, and personal fouls are
significant across all three analyses. Draft position had been shown to be significant in
predicting playing time in previous studies, and we have also shown that it is effective in
predicting productivity on the court as well. It can be argued that games and personal fouls are
closely tied, since a player who is playing more games will accumulate more personal fouls,
just by being out on the court.
Rookie PER is also tied closely with Career PER, indicating that you can fairly well
determine a player’s performance for his career after one season. The same is true for rookie
WS and rookie WSP48. However, there are limitations to these models.
In our sample, using college statistics (M1) to predict WSP48, there were eight players
that the model predicted 20 or more spots away from their ideal ranking. The two that were
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predicted 20 spots higher were Bobby Hurley, and Ed O’Bannon. Both of these players were
1st team All-American. Hurley and O’Bannon were the NCAA Tournament Most Outstanding
Player, which previous studies have shown will have an impact on draft pick. Both of these
players were picked in the top 10 of their respective drafts. This shows that there are many
outside factors that can influence a player’s career PER. Hurley was involved in a car accident
during his rookie season, which most likely shortened his career. O’Bannon had torn his ACL
before his first year of college, and that led to him only being able to play two seasons in the
NBA.
The six players that were undervalued, or picked 20 spots or more lower, were Dana
Barros, Jayson Williams, Terrell Brandon, Steve Smith, Charlie Ward, and Steve Nash.
Barros had a lower field goal percentage in college, and had low rebounds and blocks.
Williams only played 13 games his final season in college, and that led to lower totals in
general. Brandon had low rebound and block totals. Smith was a great scorer in college, but
contributed very little in the way of steals and blocks. Ward only played 16 games and had an
abysmal shooting percentage. Nash, the future Hall of Famer, actually had a low field goal
percentage, low rebound and steal totals, and zero blocks the entire year.
Of all the players whose predictions using M1 were off by 20 or more, only one
(Williams) was not a point guard or shooting guard. This was the reason to do individual
regressions by position. This was not a perfect fit, however, as eight more players were
predicted at least 20 spots away from their ideal ranking. Tate George, Michael Beasley, and
Donte Greene were all predicted at least 20 spots too high. Beasley had a stellar college
career, and was a universal high draft pick, but has never developed into a quality NBA
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player. George, a point guard, and Greene, a small forward, were artificially boosted by the
simplicity of the formulas. George played for a team that was a #1 seed in the NCAA
tournament, and that was the only variable used. Therefore, he had the lowest amount
deducted from his projected WSP48 possible. Greene was a 6’11” small forward, which is
incredibly tall for that position. Since height was significant for that position, he got a huge
boost.
Scott Burrell, Chauncey Billups, Ryan Anderson, Steph Curry, and Paul George were
all predicted at least 20 spots too low. Burrell, a small forward, was 6’7”, and only played in
26 games. Both worked against his ranking. Billups, a point guard, played for a #9 seeded
team, and was named 2nd team All-American, which is a negative coefficient for point guards.
Anderson had a decent shooting percentage, but very low steals, which are the only two
significant variables for power forwards, other than player of the year awards, which he did
not win. Curry was penalized for not making the NCAA tournament, which was aided by the
fact that he did not play in a major conference. This was the only factor that was accounted
for in Curry’s predicted rank. George was a very poor shooter in college, shooting only
42.4%. This, accompanied with his relatively low assists and blocks, led to his low ranking.
These cases demonstrate the trouble with using only a few select statistics when predicting
how a player will perform.
Of course, there are simply cases when both the real draft pick and the model value a
player highly, but the player just does not meet his perceived potential. There are five players
that both the model and the real draft had ranked a player at least 15 places too high in the
draft: Sharone Wright, Michael Beasley, Joe Alexander, Jonny Flynn, and Evan Turner. With
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the exception of Wright, all players were drafted between 2008 and 2010, outside of our
original sample. This could be attributed to the fact that they are not in the original sample,
but Beasley and Turner won POY awards, and all had outstanding college careers. This is the
variability that all owners and GM’s will inevitably have to deal with during a draft.
The results from this study indicate that college statistics do provide a good model for
predicting future NBA success, in terms of win shares per 48 minutes. The model used to
predict the draft order did a significantly better job using WSP48 to that of the actual draft.
These support my hypothesis that it is possible to adequately rank a player based solely on
their college career. The results did not hold true for PER and win shares, however.
The final analysis of the Big Board Top 100 in 2009 for the draft demonstrated that
M1 is the superior model when compared to M2, and also when compared to the draft for that
particular year. M1 had a smaller difference between the predicted draft slots and the ideal
draft slots, based on WSP48. Even with the regression equations being derived from only data
on 1st round players, M1 was able to better predict how all NBA prospects should be drafted.
Remarkably, all of the scouting and analysis done by NBA teams can be matched or improved
upon by using M1. These results validate the entire premise of this paper, that purely
quantitative methods can be used to predict which college players will have more successful
NBA careers.
There are many different aspects that future studies could explore on this subject. This
study completely ignored players from high school and international players. Since players
like LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, and Kevin Garnett have all had Hall of Fame worthy
careers, it would be interesting to see if there is any way to predict which high school players
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would have successful careers. It would also be worthwhile to get international data from
other leagues, to see if those numbers can translate into the NBA. With the mix of success and
failure of international players (future Hall of Famer Dirk Nowitzki vs. #1 overall pick and
bust Andrea Bargnani), getting better methods of predicting a foreign players success would
help shed some light on the topic.
There is also the NCAA PER variable, created by John Hollinger. This is a similar
concept to PER in the NBA, but the data is only available since 2010. Since this does not give
us a large enough time frame to adequately analyze how well NBA PER and NCAA PER are
correlated, we will have to wait until enough data is available.
Drafting successfully in the NBA is one of the greatest keys to winning. Tim Duncan
and Kobe Bryant have each won five championships, all with the one team they have played
for their entire career. Even though Bryant did not get drafted by the Lakers directly, there
was a trade in place to make sure he would end up in Los Angeles. The Lakers knew which
player they wanted, and they struck gold with a pick in the middle of the first round. The
ability to rank a player based on their college statistics is quite helpful, as well as the ability to
re-evaluate a player after they have been in the league for a year. This paper has shown that
this can be done with remarkable effectiveness.
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Appendix A: Calculations for Win Shares
FOR OFFENSIVE WIN SHARES:
1. Calculate Points Produced
Points Produced = (FG Part + Ast Part + FT Part) * (1 – (TMOR/TMScPoss) * TMOR weight *
(TMPlay%) + OR Part
Where
FGPart = 2 * (FGM + 0.5*(FG3M)) * (1 – 0.5*[(PTS-FTM)/2*FGA]*qast) estimation of how many points
produced from 2-point and 3-point shots
And
Ast Part = 2 * [(TMFGM – FGM + 0.5*(TMFG3M – FG3M)/(TMFGM – FGM)] * 0.5 * [((TMPTS –
TMFTM) – (PTS – FTM))/(2*(TMFGA-FGA))] * AST estimation of how many points one player’s assists
contributed to
And
FT Part = FTM total free throws made by player
TMOR = Team Offensive Rebounds
TMScPoss = Team Scoring Possessions
TMOR weight = [(1-TMOR%) * TMPlay%]/[(1-TMOR%)*TMPlay% + TMOR%*(1-TMPlay%)] estimation
of weight applied to a team’s offensive rebounds by how many offensive rebounds they get relative
to how many possessions they have
TMPlay% = % the team scores on its possessions when offensive rebounds are considered a new
possession
And
OR Part = OR * TMOR weight * TMPlay% * [TMPTS/(TMFGM + [1 – (1 – TMFT%)2] * 0.4 * TMFTA)]
accounts for offensive rebounds, weighted for how many opportunities the team has for offensive
rebounds
And
Qast = (MIN/(TMMIN/5))*q5 + [1-(MIN/(TMMIN/5))]*q12 estimation of how many points from your
scoring was attributed to your teammate’s assists.
Q5 = 1.14*(TMAST-AST)/TMFGM a good estimation if the player is on the court for a large number of
minutes
Q12 = [(TMAST/TMMIN) * MIN * 5 – AST]/[(TMFGM/TMMIN) * MIN * 5 – FGM] a good estimation if
the player is on the court for a small number of minutes
2. Calculate offensive possessions
Possessions = Scoring Possessions + Missed FG Part + Missed FT Part + TOV
Where
Scoring Possessions = (FG Part + AST Part + FT Part) * (1 – TMOR/TMScPoss * TMOR weight *
TMPlay%) + OR Part
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And
Missed FG Part = (FGA-FGM) * (1 – 1.07*TMOR%)
And
Missed FT Part = (1 – FT%)2 * 0.4 * FTA
3. Calculate marginal offense
Marginal Offense = Points Produced – 0.92*(league points per possession)*(offensive possessions)
Points produced and offensive possessions were calculated in steps 1 and 2, respectively. League
points per possession is just a league wide average of points scored per possession. The 0.92
multiplier is an estimation from a Pythagorean expectation equation, namely:
(1 - z)14 / ((1 - z)14 + (1 + z)14)) = 0.10
The creator of the formula assumed that a team of replacement players would win about 10% of
their games. The exponent of 14 is a rounded version of the exponent used in the NBA’s Pythagorean
expectation equation:
Team Wins = points for13.91 / points for13.91 + points against13.91
This was created by Daryl Morey, owner of the Houston Rockets, to predict how many wins a team
would have based on their points scored and points allowed. The exponent was estimated at 13.91
because it did a better job of predicting actual wins.
So solving for z in the first equation, the author came up with 0.92, which shrinks the number of
expected points a team will score, ensuring that the marginal offense for a team is non-negative. This
is important because the players most responsible for team success will get the largest share of
marginal offense. If the marginal offense is negative, they are punished by having more of the
negative marginal offense.
4. Calculate marginal points per win
Marginal points per win = 0.32 * (league points per game) * ((team pace)/(league pace)).
League points per game, team pace, and league pace are all recorded and calculated by the NBA.
0.32, to the best of my knowledge, is a multiplier to account for statistical error. Basically, marginal
points per win is a measurement of one team’s production in relation to the league average. This is
on a TEAM level, not an INDIVIDUAL level.
5. Calculate Offensive Win Shares
Offensive Win Shares = (Marginal Offense)/(Marginal Points Per Win)
FOR DEFENSIVE WIN SHARES:
1. Calculate the Defensive Rating
DRtg = TMDRtg + 0.2 * [100 * DPtsPerScPoss * (1 – Stop%) – TMDRtg]
Where
TMDRtg = # of points a team gives up per 100 possessions
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DPtsPerScPoss = # of points scored per scoring possession by the team’s opponents
Stop% = (Stops*TMMIN)/(TMPOSS*MIN)
Defensive rating is how many points a player gives up per 100 possessions
2. Calculate Marginal Defense
Marginal Defense = (Player minutes played / team minutes played) * (team defensive possessions) *
(1.08 * (league points per possession) – ((Defensive Rating)/100))
The 1.08 multiplier was created along the same logic as #3 in the Offensive Win Shares calculation.
3. Calculate marginal points per win
Marginal points per win = 0.32 * (league points per game) * ((team pace)/(league pace))
This is the same as in the Offensive Win Shares
4. Calculate Defensive Win Shares
Defensive Win Shares = (Marginal Defense)/(Marginal Points Per Win)
FOR WIN SHARES:
Win Shares = Offensive Win Shares + Defensive Win Shares
CALCULATING PER
Step 1: uPER = (1 / MP) *
[ 3P
+ (2/3) * AST
+ (2 - factor * (team_AST / team_FG)) * FG
+ (FT *0.5 * (1 + (1 - (team_AST / team_FG)) + (2/3) * (team_AST / team_FG)))
- VOP * TOV
- VOP * DRB% * (FGA - FG)
- VOP * 0.44 * (0.44 + (0.56 * DRB%)) * (FTA - FT)
+ VOP * (1 - DRB%) * (TRB - ORB)
+ VOP * DRB% * ORB
+ VOP * STL
+ VOP * DRB% * BLK
- PF * ((lg_FT / lg_PF) - 0.44 * (lg_FTA / lg_PF) * VOP) ]
Where
factor = (2 / 3) - (0.5 * (lg_AST / lg_FG)) / (2 * (lg_FG / lg_FT))
(a normalizing factor, I’m assuming)
VOP = lg_PTS / (lg_FGA - lg_ORB + lg_TOV + 0.44 * lg_FTA)
(Value of Possession. An
estimation of how many points per possession the league has scored)
DRB% = (lg_TRB - lg_ORB) / lg_TRB
(Rate of defensive rebounds)

68
Step 2: pace adjustment = lg_Pace / team_Pace
Step 3: aPER = (pace adjustment) * uPER
Step 4: PER = aPER * (15 / lg_aPER)

69
Appendix B: Statistics for PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48 Minutes

Career PER of 1st and 2nd Round Picks with NBA and NCAA Careers in Our Sample
(1985-2005)
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Career WS of 1st and 2nd Round Picks with NBA and NCAA Careers in Our Sample
(1985-2005)
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Career WSP48 of 1st and 2nd Round Picks with NBA and NCAA Careers in Our Sample
(1985-2005)
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Appendix C: 1st and 2nd Round Regression Analysis
Table A
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, 1st Round Only (N = 477)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

4.375(1.694)
-43.394(16.177)
-0.0799(0.0292)
Field Goals Made
-0.0004***(0.0002)
Field Goal Percentage
8.479***(3.122)
62.725**(29.778)
0.2238***(0.0536)
Points
0.0001*(0.0001)
Rebounds
0.0001***(0)
Assists
0.122***(0.037)
0.0001**(0.0001)
Steals
0.03***(0.009)
Blocks
0.017***(0.006)
0.109*(0.056)
0.0002**(0.0001)
Rebounds Per Game
0.158*(0.081)
1.422*(0.78)
Assists Per Game
0.462***(0.124)
Steals Per Game
10.334***(2.754)
0.015***(0.0047)
1st Team All-American
1.32***(0.372)
14.123***(3.702)
0.0181***(0.0054)
AP Player of the Year
1.484*(0.856)
35.949***(10.607)
NABC Defensive Player
9.495*(5.691)
of the Year
NABC Player of the Year
-22.89**(9.766)
USBWA Freshman of the
1.784*(0.939)
Year
Summary Statistics
R2
.207
.213
.1149
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at
the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Table B
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, 2nd Round Only (N = 336)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

8.827(1.703)
-23.912(11.602)
-0.081(0.086)
Field Goals Made
0.015(0.009)
Field Goal Percentage
48.696**(20.717) 0.28(0.171)
Steals
0.214***(0.061)
2nd Team All-American
8.18(5.445)
rd
3 Team All-American
12.851***(4.594)
Summary Statistics
R2
.011
.109
.048
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Appendix D: 1st Round by Position Regression Analysis
Table C
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, Point Guards, 1st Round Only (N = 84)
Variable
Intercept

PER
2.954(4.803)
16.246(10.13)

Win Shares
-28.721(18.802)

Win Shares per 48
Minutes
0.1079(0.0144)

Field Goal Percentage
Rebounds
0.207**(0.101)
Steals
0.042**(0.021)
Assists Per Game
7.113***(2.273)
Tournament Seed
-0.002(0.0013)
2nd Team All-American
-2.402***(0.853)
-0.048***(0.0145)
3rd Team All-American
-1.834*(1.047)
-0.0416**(0.0184)
Major Conference
1.984*(1.039)
Summary Statistics
R2
.192
.139
.142
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.

Table D
Regression of college variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
minutes, Shooting Guards, 1st round only (N = 99)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

2.83(3.813)
-2.996(9.663)
-0.082(0.062)
Field Goal Percentage
13.023*(7.744)
0.205(0.125)
Blocks
0.065**(0.027)
0.537**(0.268)
Assists Per Game
1.007***(0.27)
6.879**(2.777)
0.013**(0.004)
Blocks Per Game
0.025*(0.014)
AP POY
17.237**(8.587)
NIT MVP
45.632**(18.903)
Summary Statistics
R2
.222
.196
.157
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Table E
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, Small Forwards, 1st Round Only (N = 95)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

8.719(1.7952)
32.182(12.018)
-1.2488(0.4373)
Height
0.0089*(0.0046)
Games
0.0164***(0.006)
Free Throws Made
-0.157**(0.079)
Rebounds
0.0144***(0.0046)
-0.0019**(0.0009)
Assists
0.0188**(0.009)
1.002***(0.317)
0.0003*(0.0002)
Rebounds Per Game
0.0689**(0.0281)
Assists Per Game
-25.166**(10.14)
Team Losses
-0.1549*(0.0879)
1st Team All-American
13.3(8.042)
NABC DPOY
10.918(9.439)
Major Conference
1.2719*(0.713)
0.0207(0.013)
Summary Statistics
R2
.204
.219
.214
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Table F
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, Power Forwards, 1st Round Only (N = 113)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

27.434(5.996)
105.968(42.338)
-0.0522(0.0455)
Field Goals Attempted
0.021**(0.009)
Field Goal Percentage
0.2064**(0.081)
Free Throws Percentage
-8.011**(3.881)
-76.076**(36.984)
Rebounds
0.012**(0.005)
Steals
0.0006**(0.0003)
Rebounds Per Game
2.747(1.8)
Steals Per Game
11.102(7.198)
Team Losses
-0.556***(0.207) -4.31***(1.426)
Conference Win %
-9.873**(4.646)
-2.865(1.773)
1st Team All-American
1.169*(0.63)
AP POY
2.484*(1.391)
28.381**(14.285)
0.0256(0.0206)
NABC DPOY
31.121***(11.62)
0.0281*(0.0166)
Summary Statistics
R2
.259
.385
.171
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Table G
Regression of College Variables against NBA PER, Win Shares, and Win Shares per 48
Minutes, Centers, 1st Round Only (N = 96)
Variable
Intercept

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares per 48
Minutes

19.904(4.308)
41.038(39.713)
0.1837(0.0623)
Weight
-0.045***(0.017)
-0.389***(0.134)
-0.0005**(0.0002)
Field Goal Percentage
76.996(49.421)
Free Throws Made
0.012*(0.007)
Blocks
0.031***(0.009)
0.198***(0.069)
Rebounds Per Game
2.12(1.339)
Blocks Per Game
0.0097**(0.0038)
st
1 Team All-American
1.915**(0.877)
0.0238*(0.0127)
2nd Team All-American
12.115(8.339)
AP POY
1.051(2.234)
159.143***(24.725)
0.0073(0.0325)
Naismith Award
-152.633***(32.813)
Sporting News POY
80.655***(25.922)
NIT MVP
4.751(3.022)
Summary Statistics
R2
.504
.645
.344
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Appendix E: Regression Results
Table H
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only
(N = 425)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
-0.0042(0.0209)

Intercept
6.207(2.11)
9.248(6.388)
Weight
-0.012*(0.006)
Draft Position
-0.049***(0.019)
-0.732***(0.208)
-0.0009***(0.0003)
Games
0.08***(0.015)
0.253**(0.108)
0.0013***(0.0002)
Free Throws Made
-0.047(0.03)
Free Throw Percentage
-2.082*(1.216)
-0.0462**(0.0189)
Steals
-0.032***(0.008)
Turnovers
0.015(0.01)
-0.0001(0.0002)
Personal Fouls
-0.04***(0.008)
-0.137***(0.034)
-0.0005***(0.0001)
Steals per game
-0.0178*(0.0096)
Turnovers per game
0.131(0.661)
13.967***(2.679) 0.0175(0.0112)
Personal Fouls per game
2.12***(0.56)
0.0309***(0.0098)
Points per 36 minutes
-0.041(0.048)
Steals per 36 minutes
1.023***(0.337)
0.0153***(0.0059)
PER
0.514***(0.056)
Offensive Win Shares
0.201*(0.115)
Defensive Win Shares
0.633***(0.177)
4.346*(2.326)
Win Shares
7.538***(1.371)
0.0038**(0.0016)
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
49.862(29.666)
0.4723***(0.0457)
All-Rookie 1st Team
0.646(0.409)
Summary Statistics
.634
.487
.559
R2
Standard errors are given in parentheses next to the coefficients. The coefficients are significant at the
*10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
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Table I
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only, Point
Guards (N = 84)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Intercept
Draft Position
Games
Field Goals Made
Field Goal Percentage
PER
Win Shares
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
Summary Statistics
R2

8.47(2.735)

43.95(7.987)
-1.428***(0.419)

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
0.03250(0.01017)

0.038**(0.018)
0.00011**(0.00005)
-15.899*(9.246)
0.78***(0.141)
7.84***(1.571)
0.53177***(0.08444)
.532

.405

.472

Table J
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only, Shooting
Guards (N = 99)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Intercept
Weight
Draft Position
Field Goal Percentage
Three Point Field Goals
Minutes per game
Points per 36 minutes
Rebounds per 36 minutes
Assists per 36 minutes
Blocks per 36 minutes
PER
Defensive Win Shares
Win Shares
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
Rookie of the Year
Summary Statistics
R2

8.053(1.265)

21.725(10.401)
-1.138***(0.423)

0.056*(0.032)
-0.142(0.094)
-0.484**(0.23)

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
-0.01028(0.075)
-0.00045(0.0003)
-0.00118**(0.0006)
0.45003***(0.1015)
0.00031***(0.0001)
-0.00346***(0.0012)

4.491**(1.89)

0.00317(0.0026)
0.03601***(0.0126)

0.678***(0.107)
-8.041*(4.631)
11.028***(2.013)
0.26837***(0.0962)
2.519*(1.447)
.588

.455

.636
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Table K
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only, Small
Forwards (N = 95)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Intercept
Draft Position
Games
Field Goals Made
Free Throw Percentage
Minutes per game
Blocks per 36 minutes
Turnovers per 36 minutes
PER
Win Shares
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
Summary Statistics
R2

4.509(0.921)

-11.099(15.707)
-0.787**(0.394)
-0.137***(0.038)

0.079***(0.024)
1.016*(0.588)
0.538***(0.079)

2.282***(0.601)

2.347**(1.055)
5.478***(1.924)

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
0.04688(0.05)
-0.00181***(0.0006)
0.00085***(0.0003)
-0.00022***(0.0001)
-0.09027**(0.0426)
0.00248***(0.0008)
-0.00872*(0.0049)
0.00625**(0.0024)
0.1809(0.129)

.555

.501

.618
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Table L
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only, Power
Forwards (N = 113)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Intercept
Height
Games
Field Goal Percentage
Three Pointers Made
Free Throw Percentage
Minutes per game
Points per 36 minutes
Rebounds per 36 minutes
Assists per 36 minutes
Steals per 36 minutes
Blocks per 36 minutes
Turnovers per 36 minutes
PER
Defensive Win Shares
Offensive Win Shares
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
# of Rookie of the Month
Summary Statistics
R2

44.045(15.764)
-0.487**(0.192)

2.102(30.465)

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
0.02734(0.0214)

-0.278(0.19)
131.786**(57.876)
0.033***(0.012)
-69.255**(33.602)
0.904**(0.447)
-0.418***(0.144)

0.00133***(0.0004)
-0.00322**(0.0014)
-0.00295(0.0018)

-0.52*(0.288)
0.01466*(0.0076)
-10.144**(4.023)
1.98***(0.465)
0.845***(0.119)
0.546**(0.247)

.668

0.01534***(0.0058)
18.175***(3.939)

6.49**(3.06)

-0.01045***(0.0036)
0.90476***(0.0944)
0.00852**(0.004)

.621

.659
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Table M
Regression of Rookie Year Variables against PER, WS, and WSP48, 1st Round Only, Centers
(N = 96)
Variable

PER

Win Shares

Intercept
Weight
Games
Field Goal Percentage
Points per 36 minutes
Assists per 36 minutes
Blocks per 36 minutes
Turnovers per 36 minutes
PER
Defensive Win Shares
Win Shares per 48 Minutes
All Rookie 1st Team
All Rookie 2nd Team
Summary Statistics
R2

7.469(1.958)

39.664(29.9)
-0.188(0.115)
-0.381***(0.137)

Win Shares Per 48
Minutes
0.06004(0.0453)
-0.00037**(0.0002)

-10.431**(4.505)
-0.00633***(0.0018)
-0.00927*(0.0055)
0.353(0.256)
0.817***(0.116)
0.584**(0.288)
-18.179***(5.983)
2.173**(0.987)
-1.488**(0.718)

1.957***(0.612)
25.23***(2.653)

0.01676**(0.0064)
0.01189***(0.0016)
0.01267***(0.0037)

-18.456**(7.287)

-0.02213**(0.011)

.758

.824

.802

